AK Group (SFC)

Name: A.K. Group – Georgian Investment-Fraud Call Center

Classification: Internal / Public Awareness
Date: 2 December 2025
Prepared by: Cyber Scout Labs

1. Executive Summary

A.K. Group is a Georgian-based Structured Fraud Cell (SFC-CSR) operating as a coordinated scam room within a larger international “Scam Empire” network. From approximately 2022 to early 2025, the group ran a boiler-room style investment fraud operation from multiple offices in Tbilisi, targeting victims primarily in Europe and Canada.

Leaked internal data and media investigations indicate that:

A.K. Group defrauded over 6,100 victims worldwide. OC Media+1
The group extracted at least 35.3 million USD over about three years via fake investment platforms and deceptive “financial adviser” calls. OC Media+1
The operation formed part of a broader scam infrastructure built on a 1.9 TB leak covering 32,000+ victims and at least 275 million USD in “investments” across multiple countries. Qurium Media Foundation

A.K. Group provides a clear case study of a mid-tier fraud cell plugged into an upstream Tier-0 “shadow controller” layer that supplies platforms, leads, and payment pipelines. The group exhibits severe victim dehumanization, including mocking suicidal victims during calls, and celebrates fraud proceeds with a conspicuous luxury lifestyle. OCCRP+1

3. Who / What is A.K. Group?

A.K. Group is a Tbilisi-based call-center company identified as a central node in a global investment fraud network exposed in the Scam Empire investigation coordinated by OCCRP, SVT, and 30+ media partners. OCCRP+1

Key characteristics:

Type: Structured Fraud Cell – Coordinated Scam Room (SFC-CSR)
Primary activity: Fake online investment / trading schemes (forex, crypto, financial “advisory”). OCCRP+1
Staffing: Roughly 80–90 multilingual employees across several offices in Tbilisi, working in “conversion” (onboarding) and “retention” (pressure / extraction) teams. OCCRP+1
Victims: Primarily in Western and Central Europe and Canada, including elderly and financially vulnerable individuals. OC Media+1

Internally, employees referred to themselves as “skameri” (scammers) and openly discussed their work as fraud, removing any illusion of ignorance about the nature of the operation. OCCRP+1

4. Platforms & Operating Environment

Physical Environment

Multiple offices in downtown Tbilisi, including a large site on Kavtaradze Street. OCCRP+1
Call-center style floor: rows of operators with headsets, scripts, internal dashboards, and real-time performance monitoring. OCCRP+1

Digital Infrastructure

Use of VoIP providers to reach victims across borders at scale. OCCRP+1
Fake investment/trading platforms that mimic legitimate broker interfaces, displaying fabricated account balances and “profits.” OCCRP+1
Aggressive affiliate-ad funnels driven by marketing companies that sent “leads” (potential victims) into the Scam Empire network from social media and web ads. Qurium Media Foundation+1

Operating Environment

Part of a transnational “Scam Empire” spanning call centers in Israel, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, Spain and Eastern Europe, with centralized lead generation and platform provision. Qurium Media Foundation+2Qurium Media Foundation+2

5. Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)

1. Target Acquisition

Victims lured through online ads promising high-return investments, often featuring fake celebrity endorsements and fabricated news-style pages. The Guardian+1
Lead-generation companies collected contact details via web forms, then passed them to A.K. Group and other cells. Qurium Media Foundation+1

2. Initial Contact (“Conversion”)

Junior “conversion” agents called leads within minutes to build rapport and push initial deposits into fake trading platforms.
Scripts emphasized urgency, “exclusive opportunities,” and the illusion of licensed financial expertise. OCCRP+1

3. Grooming & Trust Building

Frequent calls, messaging, and pseudo-personal relationships with “advisers.”
Use of dashboards showing fake gains to encourage larger deposits. OCCRP+1

4. Escalation (“Retention”)

Senior “retention” agents took over once victims deposited initial sums, specializing in extracting maximum capital through repeated top-ups, loans, and credit-card use. Qurium Media Foundation+1
Psychological pressure: fear of “missing out,” shame for “wasting the opportunity,” and false claims that funds would be lost without further deposits.

5. Blocking Withdrawal & Exit

When victims attempted to withdraw, agents invented fees, taxes, and “compliance checks” requiring additional payments. OCCRP+1
Once victims were fully drained or became uncooperative, communication was cut off.

6. Internal Metrics & Incentives

Agents tracked by monthly targets (hundreds of thousands of USD per team). High performers rewarded with bonuses, trips, and lifestyle perks. OCCRP+1

6. Links to Shadow Tier & Scam Empire Network

A.K. Group is not a standalone entity. It appears as a mid-tier node within a larger Networked Fraud Operation (NFO).

Upstream “Scam Empire” structure:
The 1.9 TB leak exposed two major call-center networks, collectively responsible for at least 275 million USD stolen from 32,000+ victims in 33 countries. Qurium Media Foundation+1
Geographic spread of the network:
Scam call centers connected to the same ecosystem operated from Tel Aviv (Israel), Sofia (Bulgaria), Limassol (Cyprus), Tbilisi (Georgia), and Barcelona (Spain). Qurium Media Foundation+1
Shared infrastructure:
- Common fake broker platforms reused across different call centers.
- Affiliate marketing firms sending leads to the broader “Sapphire Network” of scam rooms. Qurium Media Foundation+1

Assessment:
A.K. Group functions as a Structured Fraud Cell (SFC-CSR) plugged into a Tier-0 shadow layer that controls platforms, payment channels, and shell-company networks. Those upstream actors remain unattributed publicly but are clearly distinct from the Georgian office-level leadership.

7. Scale & Impact

Victims: Over 6,100 people worldwide over roughly three years, according to leaked internal records. Jamnews in English+1
Financial Loss: At least 35.3 million USD stolen between 2022 and early 2025 via the Georgian call-center operation. Jamnews in English+1
Victim profile:
- Pensioners, nursing-home residents, and financially stressed individuals. The Guardian+1
- Victims often left with emptied savings, high-interest loans, and debts to friends and family. Qurium Media Foundation+1

Psychological damage is significant: multiple cases involve severe emotional distress, including suicidal ideation after discovering losses.

8. Recent Law Enforcement Actions (2024–2025 Snapshot)

Criminal probe launched (March 2025):
Following media exposure, Georgian prosecutors opened a criminal investigation into the Tbilisi-based call center operation linked to A.K. Group. OCCRP+1
Asset seizures:
Georgia’s Prosecutor General’s Office reported seizing assets belonging to “managers and agents” of the call center alleged to have stolen around 35 million USD from victims in Europe and Canada. OC Media+1
Ongoing activity despite probe:
Subsequent reporting and telecom data indicate some identified agents continued similar scam activity after exposure, suggesting partial rather than full disruption. OCCRP+1

No public evidence yet indicates that Tier-0 controllers or platform owners have been fully identified or prosecuted.

9. Threat Assessment

Operational Capability:
High. A.K. Group demonstrated the ability to:

Scale call-center operations across multiple offices.
Handle thousands of simultaneous victims.
Rapidly adapt scripts and tactics. OCCRP+1

Resilience:
Medium-High. Even after exposure and asset seizures, some operators re-engaged in fraud under new covers, showing strong regeneration capacity within the wider Scam Empire network. OCCRP+1

Harm Potential:
Severe at the individual level (life savings, mental health) and strategically significant as part of a global investment fraud ecosystem.

Overall Assessment:
A.K. Group should be treated as a high-threat Structured Fraud Cell within a transnational scam infrastructure. Disrupting one office does not neutralize the upstream network supplying platforms, leads, and laundering capacity.

10. Indicators & Red Flags

Victim-facing indicators:

Unsolicited calls from “financial advisers” following online inquiry into investments.
Guarantees of unusually high returns or “risk-free” trading opportunities.
Pressure to deposit funds into unfamiliar trading platforms, often with foreign bank accounts.
Refusal or delay when attempting withdrawals; introduction of surprise “fees” or “taxes.”
Advisers pushing victims to take loans or use credit cards to “maximize gains.”

Structural / OSINT indicators:

Broker websites with poor regulatory transparency, vague licensing claims, or offshore jurisdictions.
Reuse of the same platform interface and wording across multiple “brands.”
IP / VoIP metadata pointing to call-center hubs in known Scam Empire locations (Tbilisi, Sofia, Limassol, Tel Aviv, etc.). Qurium Media Foundation+1

11. Recommended Defensive Measures

For Individuals

Treat unsolicited investment calls as hostile until proven otherwise.
Independently verify broker licenses with official financial regulators, not links provided by the caller.
Refuse to install remote-access tools or share screenshots of banking portals.
Never send money to “investment” accounts that cannot be confirmed via reputable regulators.
If victimized, immediately report to local law enforcement and national fraud reporting centers; preserve all communication and transaction records.

For Financial Institutions / Regulators

Enhance monitoring of transfers to known high-risk PSPs and shell entities linked to investment fraud. Follow the Money+1
Share typologies and indicators derived from the Scam Empire leak with banks, fintechs, and PSPs.
Strengthen KYC/AML scrutiny on small foreign PSPs repeatedly involved in suspicious “investment” flows.

For Platforms & Ad Networks

Tighten review of “investment” and “trading” advertisements.
Use Scam Empire IOCs (domains, brand names, corporate entities) to block repeat offenders. Qurium Media Foundation+1

12. Information Gaps & Priority Questions

Tier-0 Attribution:
- Who ultimately owns and controls the fake trading platforms and shell companies servicing A.K. Group and parallel cells?
Financial Laundering Chains:
- What are the precise banking and crypto rails used to move and consolidate victim funds?
Network Mapping:
- How many additional call centers (beyond the identified Scam Empire nodes) rely on the same infrastructure?
Recruitment & Internal Mobility:
- To what extent do A.K. Group operators rotate through other Scam Empire offices in Israel, Cyprus, Bulgaria, or Spain? Qurium Media Foundation+1
Law Enforcement Coordination:
- Are cross-border task forces actively sharing data on Scam Empire entities, or are investigations siloed by country?
Victim Under-Reporting:
- How many victims are not included in the 6,100 figure due to non-reporting or early disengagement?

Sources

OCCRP – Diamonds, Dior and Dubai Vacations: The Luxurious Lives of Georgia’s Call-Center Scammers OCCRP
OCCRP – Scam Empire: Inside a Merciless International Investment Scam OCCRP
Qurium Media Foundation – Scam Empire & Scam Empire FAQ Qurium Media Foundation+1
Qurium – The Hunt & Milking the Victims to Their Last Penny Qurium Media Foundation+1
OC Media – OCCRP investigation exposes a scam empire of call centres in Georgia & Georgian authorities “seize assets” of call centre scammers OC Media+1
OCCRP – Georgia Launches Criminal Probe Into Scam Call Center Exposed by Journalists & Despite Criminal Probe, Georgian Call-Center Scammers Are Back At Work OCCRP+1
JAMnews – Luxury at Others’ Expense: How Georgian Scammers Deceived Over 6,000 People Worldwide Jamnews in English
The Guardian – Deepfakes, Cash and Crypto: How Call Centre Scammers Duped 6,000 People The Guardian
iFact – The Return of the Scammers: A.K. Group Agents Continue Their Fraud ifact.ge
OCCRP – From Rumors to Ugly Reality: Georgians Stunned by Scam Call Center’s Cruelty OCCRP